Target Corporation Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offer Contests by Tallering, Kenneth M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 5 Article 4 
1986 
Target Corporation Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offer 
Contests 
Kenneth M. Tallering 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth M. Tallering, Target Corporation Disclosure of Soft Information in Tender Offer Contests, 54 
Fordham L. Rev. 825 (1986). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol54/iss5/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
NOTES
TARGET CORPORATION DISCLOSURE OF SOFT
INFORMATION IN TENDER OFFER CONTESTS
INTRODUCTION
During a tender offer contest, shareholders must decide whether to
tender their shares to the offeror. To make an informed decision disclo-
sure is necessary. Current law places very few disclosure requirements
on the tender offer target corporation, which possesses much of the infor-
mation the investor needs. This information is often "soft information."
Soft information includes projections, appraisals and other hypothetical,
non-verifiable information.' While disclosure of such information is not
specifically required by statute, if soft information is "material" it must
be disclosed2 by the target to avoid liability under the anti-fraud provi-
sions of both the Williams Act3 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act).4 The courts must therefore determine when soft information
is "material." 5 The Third and Sixth Circuits have proposed standards
for determining when soft information is "material" in tender offer con-
tests.6 Although proposing standards is a constructive step, flaws in the
proposed standards are apparent. Part I of this Note examines these
standards and their shortcomings. Part II balances the potential utility
of soft information with its potential harm and proceeds to propose
standards.
I. CURRENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR
SHORTCOMINGS
A. Types of Tender Offers
The amount and type of disclosure necessary to protect investors de-
pends on the situation creating the need for disclosure. This Note exam-
ines the tender offer and the disclosure requirements of the target during
the contest. Three types of tender offers can be distinguished: cash, ex-
change (for securities of the offeror) and hybrid (part cash and part se-
curities of the offeror).7 Within each category, another distinction must
be made. Some offers seek all the shares stockholders would be willing to
tender at a given price while others seek only a specific percentage of the
1. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
3. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 455 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
4. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982)).
5. See infra notes 49, 51 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
7. See Note, The Federal Scheme of Tender Offer Regulation, 7 J. Corp. L 525, 525
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Federal Scheme].
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
outstanding shares.' These distinctions will later be discussed with re-
gard to the disclosure requirement of both the target and the offeror.9
A shareholder may respond to a tender offer in one of three ways. He
may sell to the offeror, sell on the market (arbitrage) or hold the shares.
If the shareholder opts to hold the shares, the nature of his holdings
becomes dependent on the success of the offer. If successful, the share-
holder owns part of the offeror company; if not, the shareholder retains
his ownership in the target.
B. Current Disclosure Requirements
The goal of the Williams Act, which governs tender offer disclosure, is
similiar to that of the other securities acts'--investor protection." The
Supreme Court has stated that the "sole purpose of the Williams Act [is]
the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer."' 2
The goal is to be accomplished by "full and fair disclosure" to sharehold-
ers.' 3 Congress also adopted a policy of neutrality between the target
and the offeror in the tender offer contest.'
4
The Williams Act imposes two disclosure requirements on the target.
First, the target must mail to shareholders or publish a statement stating
its position with regard to the offer within ten days after the commence-
ment of the offer.15 The target may recommend acceptance or rejection
of the offer, 6 remain neutral (expressing no opinion)' 7 or state that it is
unable to take a position.'" The second requirement compels the target
to file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
"as soon as practicable"' 9 after the recommendation letter is sent giving
reasons for the target's recommendation and any other information nec-
essary to prevent the target's disclosure from being misleading.
20
8. Id.
9. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
10. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 564
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("ultimate goal of the Securities Act is ... investor protection").
11. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977) ("sole purpose of the Williams
Act [is] protection of investors").
12. Id. at 35.
13. Id. at 31 (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams)).
14. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1977).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Rule 14e-2]; see Starkman v.
Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 239 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a)(1) (1985).
17. Id. § 240.14e-2(a)(2).
18. Id. § 240.14e-2(a)(3); see Federal Scheme, supra note 7, at 542.
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(a) (1985).
20. Item 4 of Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1985), pursuant to Rule 14d-
9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1985), requires a statement of the reasons for the target's posi-
tion. Item 8 of Schedule 14D-9 requires disclosure of all information "necessary to make
the required statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
materially misleading." See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 239 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
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C. Disclosure by Whom and for qzom
Courts must determine whether these requirements provide adequate
investor protection. This determination depends on who should be dis-
closing and for whose benefit. The only parties on whom disclosure re-
quirements could be placed are those with access to material
information. Parties possessing this information include the target and
the offeror and may also include brokers, analysts or financial newspa-
pers.21 The information available from brokers, analysts and financial
newspapers "will often be derived from that prepared or held by the of-
feror or the management."22 It is therefore more appropriate that the
original sources, the target and the offeror, disclose the information.3
The second issue, who should be the intended beneficiary of disclosure,
is more difficult to resolve. Traditionally, the SEC's disclosure policy has
focused on protecting unsophisticated investors.24 Unsophisticated in-
vestors, however, are at one end of the spectrum of investor sophistica-
tion. At the other extreme are analysts who study the disclosure and use
independent investigation for verification. Sophisticated investors and
professional advisors fall somewhere between these extremes.25 This
spectrum of sophistication leads to three approaches to disclosure.
Disclosure may be directed toward the protection of the unsophistica-
ted investor by ensuring that an amateur can understand all that is dis-
closed.26 This approach, historically adopted by the SEC27 and the
courts,28 has protected investors yet has precluded disclosure of much
valuable information, often soft information, because some amateurs
21. See Note, A Proposal for Affirmative Disclosure by Target Management During
Tender Offers, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 190, 190-91 & n.6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Affirma-
tive Disclosure].
22. Id. at 191. Another reason that brokers should not be subject to disclosure re-
quirements is that brokers have a potential conflict of interest that might bias their disclo-
sure. A broker effectively receives triple commission if a shareholder tenders through
him. Double commission is often paid on the actual tendering and commission is also
charged when reinvesting the money. This creates a "significant conflict of interests be-
tween the broker and its client." Id.
23. See id
24. See Fiflis, Soft Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous Zone, 26 UCLA L.
Rev. 95, 105 (1978); see also Note, Corporate and Insider Disclosure of Asset Appraisals
Under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 683, 700-01 & n.127 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Asset Appraisals]; Note, The SEC Safe Harbor for Forecasts--A Step in the Right
Direction?, 1980 Duke L.J. 607, 610 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Safe Harbor].
25. See Feit v. Ieasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565-66
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
26. See Fiflis, supra note 24, at 105.
27. See supra note 24.
28. See Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 700 & n.127 (the courts implicitly based
their fear of misinterpretation by investors on the model of the unsophisticated investor);
see, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973) (one reason
for the SEC's policy against disclosure of asset appraisals is its concern that investors
would overestimate their value); Union Pac. R.R. v. North W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 409
(N.D. Ill. 1964) ("Predictions, estimates, and opinions are more elusive and may present




A disclosure scheme might also seek to protect unsophisticated inves-
tors by disclosure targeted at the sophisticated professional who in turn is
expected to filter the information to the unsophisticated investor.3" This
approach would tolerate disclosure of much more soft information be-
cause "sophisticates can themselves weigh its relevance against its relia-
bility."31 Proponents of this approach overlook the goal of disclosure-
investor protection. The unsophisticated investor receives only second-
hand information tainted by the views and sales interest of the profes-
sional.32 Under this approach, it is likely that such an investor will be
deprived of an opportunity to take advantage of undervalued stock. The
"efficient capital market hypothesis"3 3 suggests that by the time informa-
tion is filtered down to the unsophisticated investor, a stock's price will
reflect its true value with regard to all publicly disclosed information.34
This approach does not protect the investor; it simply forces him to seek
professional guidance.35
29. See Fiflis, supra note 24, at 105; Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 610.
30. See House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 344-79 [hereinafter cited as Report], abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 81,357, at 88,665 (Nov. 3, 1977) (disclosure of infor-
mation useful to reasonably knowledgeable investors should be encouraged while disclo-
sure of simplified formats and summaries useful to amateurs should be left to
disseminators); Fiflis, supra note 24, at 106 & n.37 (disclosure should be for sophisticates
who will filter the information to the public and thereby cause market prices to adjust
efficiently to the information as interpreted by the knowledgeable).
31. Fiflis, supra note 24, at 107; see Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 701-02; Safe
Harbor, supra note 24, at 611-12.
32. The information must pass through the investment advisor who simplifies it and
includes his subjective evaluation and bias in it before disclosing the information to his
client.
33. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 3-5 (1978). "An efficient
capital market is one in which a trader cannot improve his overall chances of speculative
gain by obtaining public information. . . ." Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted). This type of
market results from the competitive efforts of analysts and investors who strive to gain
superior returns by identifying undervalued or overvalued securities. This competitive
process ensures that market prices reflect all publicly available information. Insider trad-
ing restrictions create inefficiency in the market because insiders cannot trade based on
their information. Id. at 4. See generally Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,
Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 1031,
1034-41 (1977).
34. If disclosure is aimed at sophisticates, the individual investor will lose the chance
to trade misvalued stocks before the competitive process makes price equal to value. This
will occur because those who receive information first-hand (brokers) and those who are
informed directly thereafter (large, institutional clients) will trade the stock enough to
correct the misvaluation. See Note, The SEC Policy for Projections: New Problems in
Disclosure, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 242, 245-46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as New Problems].
35. See Mann, Prospectuses: Unreadable or Just Unread?-A Proposal to Reexamine
Policies Against Permitting Projections, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 222, 227 (1971); Safe Har-
bor, supra note 24, at 612-13 ("if investors must rely on the filtration process to receive
necessary information, the . . . disclosure program has not fulfilled its statutory pur-
pose"); New Problems, supra note 34, at 245-46.
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The third, and most appropriate, approach provides disclosure for
both the sophisticated and the unsophisticated investor. This "differen-
tial disclosure"3 6 policy attempts to strike a "pragmatic balance... be-
tween the needs of the unsophisticated investor and those of the
knowledgeable student of finance."" Such disclosure should include a
"clearly written narrative statement outlining the major aspects... and
particularly speculative elements, as well as detailed financial informa-
tion which will have meaning only to the expert." 38 Disclosure premised
on this model would still promote filtering of information that could not
be understood by the unsophisticated, but at the same time would allow
the educated investor, if he or she so chooses, to decide whether to tender
without referring to an investment professional.39 Like disclosure for so-
phisticates, this approach promotes the use of soft information.' "Differ-
ential disclosure," however, also requires that precautionary steps be
taken to avoid misleading investors.4 "Differential disclosure," by meet-
ing the needs of the entire spectrum of investors, has gained acceptance




Soft information is a highly relative concept that cannot be clearly de-
lineated from hard information.' Soft information may be defined as
information other than objectively verifiable or historical facts (hard in-
formation).45 It includes projections of future earnings, appraised asset
36. See Fiflis, supra note 24, at 105-06; Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 702.
37. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (quoting SEC, Disclosure to Investors, A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative
Policies Under the'33 and '34 Acts, at 96 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wheat Report]); see
Sec. Act Release No. 5427 [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I' 79,519, at
83,425 (Oct. 4, 1973) (disclosure should not be intended to serve the direct needs of the
"average investor" who does not have the time or training to fully understand the infor-
mation, although such information should still be available to the "average investor").
38. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 566 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (quoting Wheat Report, supra note 37, at 52).
39. The statutory goal of allowing investors to make informed decisions would there-
fore be fulfilled. See Mann, supra note 35, at 227.
40. See Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 611-12.
41. See id. at 612. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
42. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565-66
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968) ("The speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also 'reasonable' inves-
tors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders."), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
43. See Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 702-03; Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 611-
12; cf Mann, supra note 35, at 227 (prospectus intended to furnish all information neces-
sary for both individual investors and investment services).
44. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev.
254, 256 (1972); see Fiflis, supra note 24, at 96 & n.3.
45. See Report, supra note 30, at 347, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
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valuations and other hypothetical data.46 No definition is exhaustive be-
cause "[m]any apparently hard statements have soft cores and vice
versa."47 The indicia of soft information include its subjectivity and its
presentation as opinion, belief, plan or expectation rather than affirna-
tive representation.48
Target companies have no specific legal obligation to disclose soft in-
formation.49 Since no provision directly requires disclosure of soft infor-
mation, courts must determine whether Rule lOb-55° requires its
disclosure as "material" information. 5 Discretion is left to the courts to
determine what soft information, if any, is "material."
2. SEC Treatment of Soft Information
Courts have deferred to the SEC in determinations of materiality.
Prior to 1972, the SEC generally prohibited disclosure of soft informa-
tion.12 The SEC, however, was more tolerant of soft information in
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977); Schneider, supra note 44, at 254-
57.
46. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 874 (1972); see Fiflis, supra note 24, at 96 n.3 ("Soft information includes forc-
casts of earnings, revenues, and other financial data; budgets for capital expenditures;
future dividend policy; management analyses of financial statements; or any other for-
ward-looking or even past, but subjectively determined, information concerning prospects
of a company for investment use.").
47. Schneider, supra note 44, at 256. Even traditionally hard information ("facts")
such as historical financial statements may have a soft core because accounting is an
inexact science based on subjective evaluations. Alternatively, a statement regarding
one's reputation is not a "fact," yet it is often considered a "fact" that can be proven in
court under traditional rules of evidence. Id.; see Fiflis, supra note 24, at 96 n.3.
48. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 256-57 ("The relative hardness of a statement
should turn less on its form (for example, a statement concerning what will happen as
opposed to a statement of present expectation) and more on the underlying substance.").
49. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 239 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Resource Exploration v. Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F.
Supp. 54, 64 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Other cases implicitly support this proposition by pro-
ceeding directly to a discussion of "materiality" and therefore assuming that disclosure is
not required. See, e.g., Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., 571 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
50. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (1985), promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), provides in perti-
nent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange, . . . (b) [t]o make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading . . .in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
5 1. See supra note 49.
52. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 257-58; Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 608 & n.3.
Disclosure of soft information was required when it created specific negative inferences.
See Schneider, supra note 44, at 261-62.
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tender offers or proxy contests than in prospectuses and other filings.53
Such information was often disseminated through informal press releases
and publications.5 4 In 1976, the SEC deleted earnings projections from a
list of potentially misleading disclosures" as it shifted its position on soft
information toward greater permissiveness. For example, the SEC
adopted a "safe harbor" provision in 1979.56 Its purpose was to en-
courage disclosure of projections by protecting issuers from liability if the
disclosure was made in good faith and had a reasonable basis.5 7 A bur-
den of proof was placed on the party seeking to establish liability.58 By
the late 1970's, the SEC actually began to encourage disclosure of projec-
tions.59 The Advisory Committee Report to the SEC in 1977 urged the
SEC to "encourage responsible experimentation with disclosure of soft
information."' 6 The SEC has yet to promulgate rules mandating disclo-
sure of soft information despite the policy of encouraging its disclosure.
3. Standards Proposed by the Courts
The courts have been slow and inconsistent in following the SEC's
shifts in position. In 1984, the Third Circuit's decision in Flynn v. Bass
Brothers Enterprises, Ina6 noted the evolution of the SEC's policy to-
ward encouraging disclosure of soft information in tender offer con-
tests.62 The court proposed a standard, however, that provides no
guidance for corporations in their disclosure decisions.63 Flynn involved
a tender offer for National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling Company
(National Alfalfa) by Bass Brothers. Bass Brothers had purchased asset
appraisals for the assets of National Alfalfa.' The court held that there
existed no duty to disclose the asset appraisals6 s but that asset appraisals
are not as a matter of law immaterial and in appropriate cases must be
disclosed.6 6 The court stated that the duty to disclose asset valuations
and other soft information should be made on a "case by case basis, by
weighing the potential aid such information will give a shareholder against
53. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 261 & n.20.
54. See Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 608.
55. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5699 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 80,461, at 86,200 (April 23, 1976) withdrew earnings projections as an
example of a potentially misleading disclosure from the note to Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1985).
56. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810 (1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1985)) (commenting
on 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1979)).
57. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810, 38,810 (1979).
58. See id. at 38,811.
59. See id.; see also Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 608-09.
60. Report, supra note 30, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977).
61. 744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 986-88.
63. See infra note 68.
64. See Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 981-82 (3rd Cir. 1984).
65. See id. at 990-01.
66. See id. at 988.
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the potential harm, such as undue reliance, if the information is released
with a proper cautionary note."6 7 The court then listed the factors that
must be considered in this balancing process. They include:
the facts upon which the information is based; the qualifications of
those who prepared or compiled it; the purpose for which the informa-
tion was originally intended; its relevance to the stockholders' impend-
ing decision; the degree of subjectivity or bias reflected in its
preparation; the degree to which the information is unique; and the
availability to the investor of other more reliable sources of
information. 68
A somewhat more definitive position was adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
In Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co. ,69 the court considered whether Mara-
thon had a duty to disclose asset appraisals and earnings projections dur-
ing U.S. Steel's tender offer for control of Marathon.7" The court held
that no such duty existed,7" and in so doing articulated its standard for
disclosure of soft information. The tender offer target "must disclose
projections and asset appraisals based upon predictions regarding future
economic and corporate events only if the predictions underlying the ap-
praisal or projection are substantially certain to hold. ,72 This is because
predictions that are "substantially certain to hold" are material informa-
tion and therefore require disclosure.73 The target may choose to dis-
close projections and appraisals not rising to this level of certainty and, if
so, "must also inform the shareholders as to the basis for and limitations
on the projected realizable values."'74 The Sixth Circuit criticized the
Third Circuit's "case by case" standard as "uncertain and unpredict-
able."" The Sixth Circuit's standard, which focuses on the certainty of
the data, "ensures that the target company's shareholders will receive all
essentially factual information, while preserving the target's discretion to
disclose more uncertain information without the threat of liability, pro-
vided appropriate qualifications and explanations are made."'76
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id. Courts using this standard can come to any result they wish by placing
whatever weights they wish on the factors when balancing potential aid with potential
harm. This is unfortunate because both management and counsel need clear standards to
help them decide whether and in what form they will disclose forecasts. See Safe Harbor,
supra note 24, at 639.
69. 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
70. See id. at 233.
71. See id. at 242.
72. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
73. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
74. Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).




E. Inadequacies of the Current Law
1. Insufficient Information
Under current law, despite the goal of the Williams Act, an investor
may be left without the proper information from the target to make an
informed decision. The most apparent problem arises under Rule 14e-2
regarding the target company's obligation to make a recommendation to
its shareholders." If the target opts to remain neutral (express no opin-
ion) or finds that it is unable to take a position, as it is allowed to do
under existing rules,7" the investor receives no information. 9
A second deficiency exists because permissive disclosure by the target
is based on the market force theory," which, in turn, is based on ques-
tionable assumptions. The theory assumes a heated battle wherein each
side wants to disclose all information that might strengthen its position,
thereby providing the investor with all necessary information. 81 In prac-
tice, the investor will not receive adequate information in certain circum-
stances. If the target has no incentive to fight the offer, the market
theory will fail.82 For example, the offeror may pay the "price for man-
agement's support or neutrality [which] may be an attractive employ-
ment contract or similar emoluments. Management silence might
therefore often conceal bargained-for acquiescence, to the possible detri-
ment of target shareholders interests."8"
Finally, the flow of valuable soft information to the investor is re-
stricted by court decisions that place undue emphasis on reliability of the
77. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
79. See Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Offer Transactions. The Dice are Still Loaded,
42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 25-29 (1980) ("management may remain silent as to its position,
thus depriving shareholders of the guidance and advice they seek"); cf. Affirmative Disclo-
sure, supra note 21, at 201 (the most serious objection to the law, prior to Rule 14e-2, was
that management could readily avoid the 14(d) disclosure requirement by not making a
recommendation to shareholders). But cf Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties
of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 403, 405 (1980) (Rule
14e-2 increased the information available to investors, thus aiding open-market determi-
nation of the success or failure of an offer).
80. See Report, supra note 30, at 354, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,357, at 88,664 (Nov. 3, 1977); Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 623
& n.88.
81. See Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 623 & n.88.
82. See Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 206-07.
83. Id (footnotes omitted). To a great extent this problem has been resolved. Rule
14d-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1985), requires that the target file a Schedule 14D-9, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1985), when the target makes its recommendation to shareholders.
Item 3(b) of Schedule 14D-9 mandates that "any contract, agreement, arrangement or
understanding and any actual or potential conflict of interest" if material, between target
management and the offeror, be disclosed. Id. This would help shareholders to evaluate
recommendations and possibly prevent the offeror from buying management's support or
neutrality. It might also explain why management chose to surrender rather than fight
an offer thus providing the investor with valuable information. The problem still arises if
an offer is made to target management after the recommendation. In that case, the share-
holders may not receive the information.
1986]
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information while undervaluing the need for such information.84 These
decisions have contributed to a paradoxical situation. Soft information is
leaked to investors without verification because it has been excluded from
SEC filings to protect investors.85 Yet if soft information were permis-
sively or mandatorily disclosed it would be subject to SEC scrutiny and
would therefore be more reliable.8 6
2. Fairness to the Average Investor
A policy of nondisclosure of soft information may be unfair to the
individual investor.8 7 If a corporation chooses not to take advantage of
the permissive disclosure system, but rather to disseminate the informa-
tion informally, it is often the analysts, bankers and other investment
experts who will receive the information, and not the individual
investor.8
3. Time Lags
Judicial decisions have done little to resolve the soft information issue,
partly because of the time lag between when a challenged tender offer is
made and when a trial or appellate court finally renders a decision on
it.89 The case suggesting this time lag dilemma, Flynn v. Bass Brothers
Enterprises, Inc., itself exemplifies the problem. The tender offer at issue
occurred in 1976;90 the Third Circuit decision came down in 1984."'
84. See, e.g., Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985) (deter-
mination as to whether there exists a duty to disclose soft information rests solely on its
reliability), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.,
458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.) (applying the general rule of excluding asset valuations from
disclosure because no truly reliable estimates had materialized), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text.
86. See Report, supra note 30, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977) ("when companies formally publish pro-
jections they are likely to exercise greater care in preparing the information"); Asset Ap-
praisals, supra note 24, at 701 ("permissive or mandatory formal disclosure would subject
it to the Commission's scrutiny, thereby increasing the protection afforded investors");
New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings - A Panel Discussion, 28
Bus. Law. 505, 508 (1973) (remarks of Carl Schneider) (inclusion of soft information in
filings would make it more reliable) [hereinafter cited as New Approaches].
87. See Comment, Fearless Forecasts: Corporate Liability for Earnings Forecasts that
Miss the Mark, 16 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L. Rev. 115, 119 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Fearless Forecasts]; Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 612-13; New Problems, supra note 34,
at 246-47; Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under the Securities Laws, 88
Yale L.J. 338, 351-52 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Future-Oriented Information].
88. This process is clearly illegal if the information is "material." See Future-Ori-
ented Information, supra note 87, at 351 n.74. Issuers have a responsibility to disclose
material facts, both favorable and unfavorable, to all investors. Id.; see SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5699 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,461, at
86,202-03 (April 23, 1976). See supra note 87.
89. See Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 987-88 (3rd Cir. 1984) (time lags
have "retarded the evolution of the law concerning disclosure").
90. Id. at 982.
91. Id. at 978.
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Such time lags have prevented the courts from keeping up with changing
SEC policies because courts are often "loath to impose a huge liability" if
the law has evolved in the interim.9 2
4. Problems with the Standards
The few cases that have been decided provide inadequate guidance for
corporations seeking to determine their disclosure obligations for a given
piece of data. The two standards available, Flynn and Starkman, are
neither compatible with nor sufficiently sensitive to the needs of inves-
tors. Part II suggests a standard that more appropriately weighs the po-
tential value of soft information against its potential harm.
II. STANDARDS
Standards for the disclosure of soft information should balance the po-
tential value of disclosure to the investor against the potential harm to
both the investor93 and the discloser.94 The potential value is the addi-
tional guidance the investor may derive from the information in making
his decision to tender.9" The potential harm includes the unreliability of
the information,9 6 the possibility of misinterpretation,97 the cost to the
target of producing the disclosure,98 the possible weakening of the tar-
get's competitive position99 and the potential for management manipula-
tion of the stock price."°°
A. Potential Value of Soft Information
Potential value should take the investor's decisionmaking into ac-
92. Id at 978-88 (quoting Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d
Cir. 1973)). Gerstle, another example of time lags, was decided in 1973, while the proxy
statement at issue was disclosed in 1963. See Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1281, 1287.
93. See Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984); South Coast
Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1982)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).
94. See supra note 93.
95. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
96. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1985) (to
increase reliability, the court focused on the certainty of the underlying data), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir.
1984) (consider factors such as the facts on which the information is based, the qualifica-
tions of those who prepared it, and the degree of subjectivity or bias in its preparation
when balancing potential aid with potential harm).
97. See Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 610-12; Future-Oriented Information, supra
note 87, at 353-55. See supra note 93.
98. See Report, supra note 30, at 353, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977); Affirmative Disclosure, supra note
21, at 215-16; Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 616; Future-Oriented Information, supra
note 87, at 356-57.
99. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 276; Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87,
at 357-58.
100. See Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 614 & n.33.
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count.' 01 The relevant decision is the one made by a target shareholder
to retain his shares or tender them to the offeror. It is not relevant for
purposes of the target's disclosure whether the offer is a cash offer or an
exchange offer; nor is it relevant whether it is for control. In either case,
the shareholder, using the target's disclosure, must place a value on each
share and compare that value to the offered price."0 2
Various formulae for valuing shares during a tender offer contest have
been proposed.'0 3 The common element present in each is a valuation of
the subsequent market price of the stock.'" This process has been de-
scribed as "capitalizing projected future income."105 A second crucial
determination is an estimate of the probability of success of the offer. '0 6
Much of the information an investor needs to estimate the subsequent
market price and probability of success of the offer is soft information
that is only known to and therefore only disclosable by the target. Some
101. See Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 341-43 ("In order to make a
realistic, informed investment decision, investors need information about the future of the
firm."); see also Fiflis, supra note 24, at 100-04 (soft information is relevant to the funda-
mental decisionmaking process); Johnson, supra note 79, at 4-5 (neither the courts nor
the SEC have been sufficiently sensitive to the fact that most investors are future oriented
in their decision making); Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 191-92 (a determina-
tion must be made as to what information an investor needs when deciding whether to
tender).
102. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 6 ("The shareholder must evaluate his holdings in
the target company and must compare his potential future benefits from that company
with the benefits that might accrue to him if he accepts the offer."). Disclosure by the
offeror is necessary to evaluate the offer. If the offer is for cash and for control, the
shareholder will want to know the prospects of success under the offeror's management.
If the offer is for cash and not for control, disclosure by the offeror is not essential. Fur-
thermore, if the offer is for securities of the offeror, whether or not for control, disclosure
by the offeror is necessary to value those securities. See generally Borden & Weiner, An
Investment Decision Analysis of Cash Tender Offer Disclosure, 23 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 553
(1978). This Note is concerned only with disclosure by the target, which is necessary to
value the shareholder's holdings in the target. Hence, the investor needs the same infor-
mation to evaluate his holdings regardless of whether the offer is for cash or securities
and whether or not the offer is for control.
103. See infra note 104.
104. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1164 (1981) ("The value of any
stock can be understood as the sum of two components: the price that will prevail in the
market if there is no successful [tender] offer (multiplied by the likelihood that there will
be none) and the price that will be paid in a future tender offer (multiplied by the likeli-
hood that some offer will succeed)."); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids,
Harv. Bus. Rev. 135, 147 (Mar.-Apr. 1967) ("Whether it is better to hold or to sell re-
quires an assessement of the relative merits of the competing groups, an estimate of the
probabilities of the tender's success or failure, and a further estimate of the subsequent
price action of the stock in either event."); Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 191-
92 (one factor in the shareholder's decision is the "estimated post-offer market value of
the target's shares").
105. Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 615; see Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some
Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1197 (1970).
106. See Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 191 (the "likelihood of the tender
offeror's success in obtaining its objective" is a factor to be considered in the investor's
decision). See supra note 104.
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hard information regarding past performance,107 brokerage fees, tax lia-
bility' and other investment opportunities"° is clearly relevant, but
that information is either already included in disclosure or readily avail-
able from other sources."10 The relevant soft information disclosable
only by the target includes: 1) earnings projections (as well as sales, reve-
nues and expenses), which are "among the most significant factors in
influencing securities prices;"' 2) asset appraisals, which provide inves-
tors with present value information necessary to read income statements
and balance sheets without being misled;" 2 3) management recommen-
dations, which have a direct effect on the success of the offer;"I3 and 4)
other plans and expectations, which may inform the investor of the direc-
tion the target is headed." 4
Some have argued that due to the efficiency of capital markets, "15 such
disclosure is unnecessary because the current market price already re-
flects all publicly disclosed information. 1 6 However, information is re-
flected in the market price only if it has been publicly disclosed. I 7 Soft
information often would not have been disclosed. It would remain as
inside information that should not have been traded on due to insider
107. Past performance is relevant only to the extent that it may enable an investor to
predict future results. See Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 341 & n.20.
108. See Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 191 (factors to be considered in deci-
sion include "adjustments to reflect the shareholder's tax liability if he sells rather than
holds and brokerage fees").
109. See Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 342-43 ("Comparability across
a wide range of investment opportunities ... is necessary to ensure an optimal investment
decision.").
110. See Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 191.
111. Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 615.
112. See Assets Appraisals, supra note 24, at 703. See infra note 201.
113. See infra note 162.
114. See infra note 218.
115. See supra note 33.
116. See, eg., Fischel, supra note 33, at 24. The argument against disclosure based on
the efficiency of capital markets assumes that information that has not been traded on
because of insider trading restrictions is the only information not already taken into con-
sideration in the market price and suggests that even this situation is rare. Given this
assumption, it is early to conclude that "any gains from disclosure of inside information
that would otherwise not be made public absent an affirmative disclosure obligation do
not outweigh the harm." Id If all soft information is included in this insider informa-
tion category, then the "inefficiency" created by such insider information is not rare but
rather very common. It becomes more difficult to conclude that the benefits of non-
disclosure outweigh the harms. Furthermore, soft information often does not remain
entirely "inside." It is leaked to a select group of analysts and large investors. This is
"semi-public" information that could be public, and therefore reflected in the market
price, if filtered to the public but may not be if limited to those who received it. See also
Report, supra note 30, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCI) g 81,357, at 88,664 (Nov. 3, 1977) (" '[E]fficient market hypothesis'... even if
valid, does not negate the necessity of a mandatory disclosure system. This theory is
concerned with how the market reacts to disclosed information and is silent as to the
optimum amount of information.").
117. See supra note 33.
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trading restrictions.11 For that reason, additional soft information that
has yet to be reflected in the market price should not be barred from
disclosure. 119
B. Potential Harm of Soft Information
The potential value of soft information to decisionmaking must be
weighed against the potential harm of disclosure. The unreliability of the
disclosed information is an obvious potential harm. 120 As mentioned
previously, courts have adhered to the traditional SEC position and have
exaggerated a legitimate concern for reliable information, fearing that
"the inclusion of soft information in filings would clothe such informa-
tion with an unduly high aura of credibility."'' While reliability is a
reasonable concern, investor protection would be better served not by
prohibiting disclosure and forcing informal disclosure of such informa-
tion, but rather by subjecting soft information to the scrutiny of the
SEC.' 2 2 This would encourage greater accuracy and would assure that
the investor receives information first-hand. 123 Appropriate cautionary
notes accompanying the information would discourage undue reliance on
the information by target shareholders.' 24
A second potential danger is misinterpretation. 125 This traditional ob-
jection to disclosure has become less significant with the adoption of "dif-
ferential disclosure" (aimed at both sophisticates and unsophisticates). 26
The assumption "that investors will be misled [by soft information] un-
derestimates the capability of investors, who are generally accustomed to
dealing with soft information through the normal workings of the mar-
ket." 127 Investors understand the inherent uncertainties of projections,
especially when forewarned by cautionary language. 128  Concern about
misinterpretation should therefore weigh less in the decision to disclose
118. See supra note 116.
119. See Fischel, supra note 33, at 24.
120. If soft information was totally reliable, its disclosure would always be required
because of its relevance to the investor's decision.
121. Schneider, supra note 44, at 258. See supra note 84.
122. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 85, 88 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
125. See Note, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of Securi-
ties Regulation, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1525, 1534 (1981) (investors can be misled in four
ways: 1) by accepting projections as excessively authoritative, 2) by inaccurate forecasts,
3) by wrong information in forecasts, and 4) by focusing the investor on short-term re-
sults) [hereinafter cited as Mandatory Disclosure]; Future-Oriented Information, supra
note 87, at 353-55 (misleading investors, a traditional objection to disclosure, is based on
fears of investor confusion and management manipulation).
126. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
127. Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 611-12; see Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 701;
New Approaches, supra note 86, at 509.
128. See Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 611-12.
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soft information and more in deciding how 129 to disclose such
information.
The cost of producing and disseminating disclosure is another poten-
tial harm. Although the costs of disclosure are sizable,' 31 the disclosure
of soft information, especially projections, "would not impose significant
additional costs, at least for companies that already compile the informa-
tion for their own internal use."'' This category includes most busi-
nesses. 132 Furthermore, the cost of disclosure "will often be at its lowest
point while a tender offer is outstanding."' 33 This is so because the duty
arises on the occurrence of a readily identifiable event, the offer, and dur-
ing the offer the media will more readily print releases and investors will
be alerted to watch for such disclosure."3 Cost is always a consideration
when imposing a disclosure obligation, but the additional cost of requir-
ing disclosure of soft information is not significant.' 3
The weakening of a firm's competitive position by disclosing future
strategy has also been suggested, most often by management, as a poten-
tial harm.'36 While the likelihood of weakening a firm's competitive po-
sition is greater with soft information than hard information, 137 a
carefully conceived disclosure requirement need not require disclosure of
specific plans, predictions, expectations and negotiations that could cause
this harm. 1 3  The availability of such specific information is not essential
to accomplishing the purpose of disclosure of soft information: protect-
ing investors by "providing an indication to investors of the direction and
magnitude of management plans."' 39 The disclosure requirements
placed on a target will not be detrimental for two reasons: management
129. The decision how to disclose should encompass the format of the disclosure and
the cautionary note accompanying the disclosure.
130. See Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 125, at 1539-40 ('extraordinary expense
involved in preparing sophisticated financial forecasts and their accompanying underly-
ing assumptions for public dissemination").
131. Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 616; see Future-Oriented Information, supra note
87, at 356-57. But see Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 125, at 1539 ("Internally gener-
ated projections are generally designed for management purposes only, and in many cases
are not suitable for public presentation.").
132. See Kripke, supra note 105, at 1197 (most large companies use projections as the
basis for making important decisions); Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 357
("all public companies are now required to maintain systems of internal control and ...
most businesses regularly generate projections for internal use") (footnotes omitted).
133. Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 215.
134. Id. at 215-16.
135. See iL at 216; Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 616; Future-Oriented Information,
supra note 87, at 356-57. But see Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 125, at 1539-40 (costs
would be significant).
136. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 276; Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 125, at
1540; Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 357.
137. Schneider, supra note 44, at 276 (significant adverse developments may be "more
likely to occur when a company must disclose its future plans, strategies or expectations,
as contrasted with historical data").




currently informally disseminates much of the same information without
weakening the firm's position, 140 and the disclosure of such information,
if material, is already required by other disclosure provisions. 4' There
will, however, be one adverse effect of disclosure of even non-specific
management direction; management may be in the process of redirecting
the corporation in some way-for example, the sale or acquisition of as-
sets-when a tender offer is made and disclosure may place such plans in
jeopardy.142 When this problem occurs, a disclosure standard should re-
quire that plans need not be disclosed unless they are "firm."'14 3 Further-
more, the SEC should develop a petition system that would allow a
corporation to prepare its disclosure on the sensitive topic with the SEC's
guidance so as to inform the investor of general trends and not specific
information that would jeopardize the transaction. 44 The possibility of
this single adverse effect, and the fear of weakening a firm's competitive
position in general, are not a sufficient basis to preclude disclosure of soft
information. 145
The final danger is the possible manipulation by management of the
stock price through disclosure of soft information. 146  Manipulation is
much more likely in situations other than tender offer contests for two
reasons. Corporations may, for ordinary reporting purposes, defer dis-
closure until a pending project is over.' 47 During a tender offer, how-
ever, the target has no choice when to disclose because the duty arises
upon the occurrence of the offer. In addition, investors generally scruti-
nize management disclosure during a tender offer with extra care. They
do so with the realization that management's objective may not be inves-
140. See Report, supra note 30, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977); Future-Oriented Information, supra note
87, at 351 & n.74.
141. The anti-fraud provisions of the Williams Act and the 1934 Act require the dis-
closure of all "material" information to avoid liability. T. Hazen, The Law of Securities
Regulation 313, 337 (1985); see Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 358 &
n. 108. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 44, at 276 ("a public financing cannot proceed
when critical developments are in progress and adequate disclosure is impossible or
inappropriate").
143. See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 609, 621
(1967) (corporations should withhold disclosure of plans until they are ripe when seeking
to acquire control); Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 358 ("management
would not be required to reveal inchoate plans or delicate negotiations until arrangements
are concrete").
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1982) gives the SEC the power to create rules and regulations,
such as the one suggested, to implement the provisions it is responsible for.
145. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 276 ("The possibility of some competitive disad-
vantage in isolated cases is not a factor which should preclude all mandatory disclosures
about future plans."); see also Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 357-58 (for-
mal disclosure of forecasts is unlikely to injure the company). But see Mandatory Disclo-
sure, supra note 125, at 1540 (mandatory forecasting "might create significant
competitive problems for some firms").
146. See Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 125, at 1537-38; Future-Oriented Informa-
tion, supra note 87, at 355-56.
147. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 276.
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tor protection but rather retention of control.148 Furthermore, the tar-
get's disclosure is always subject to the anti-fraud provisions of both the
Williams Act and the 1934 Act. Fear of manipulation should not restrict
the disclosure of soft information.1 49
C. A Proposal for Fair and Predictable Standards
The various factors that must be considered when weighing the poten-
tial value of soft information against its potential harm make it extremely
difficult to formulate a single standard for disclosure. A standard that
varies according to the type of soft information at issue would be more
realistic.150 Soft information includes at least three categories: 1) projec-
tions of earnings, sales, revenues and expenses; 2) asset appraisals; and 3)
other soft information, including plans and expectations, capital budget-
ing and expenditures and future dividend policy.' These categories are
far from exhaustive.' 5 2 Any information that is neither historical nor
objectively verifiable may be considered soft information. 153 For exam-
ple, analyses of management integrity and efficiency are soft information
but wholly separate from and outside the scope of this Note.'- A stan-
dard for each category will be proposed.
1. Assumptions
Before proposing standards, certain assumptions that apply to all stan-
dards proposed in this Note must be stated. The first assumption is that
disclosure should be for both the sophisticated and the unsophisticated
investor ("differential disclosure").'55 The second assumption is that the
"efficient capital market hypothesis" does not preclude the need for soft
information because only information that has previously been disclosed
can be reflected in the market price.' 56
148. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 6; Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 217-19.
149. See Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 355.
150. The Starkman standard treats all soft information the same and mandates disclo-
sure solely on the basis of reliability of information. The need for soft information, how-
ever, varies drastically according to the type of information. Some soft information is
more relevant to the shareholder's decision than other information. The need for other
information may arise only in certain circumstances. The Flynn standard does take these
variations into account. One of the factors listed by the Third Circuit in Flynn is the
information's relevance to the shareholder's impending decision. Flynn v. Bass Bros.
Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984). This standard, however, does not provide
adequate guidance for corporations to assess their duty to disclose.
151. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Ferrara, Starr, & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on
Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 555 (1981).
155. See supra Part I.C.
156. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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2. Accompanying Rules
Apart from the underlying assumptions are three rules that, along
with the standards to be proposed, comprise this Note's disclosure
scheme for soft information. Each is designed to resolve a specific inade-
quacy in the current law. These rules include mandatory recommenda-
tion by management, mandatory disclosure of an appropriate cautionary
statement and mandatory disclosure of assumptions underlying the infor-
mation to be disclosed.
Under current law, the target may make a recommendation that effec-
tively provides the investor with no information by remaining neutral or
stating that it is unable to take a position.'5 7 These options should not be
permitted. 5 8 Management should be required to recommend either ac-
ceptance or rejection of the offer, to state the reasons for the recommen-
dation, 159 and to warn the shareholders that the recommendation does
not take into account personal factors that might enter into the investor's
decision. 6 ' When management has special reasons that prevent making
a recommendation, it should be allowed to petition the SEC for an ex-
emption. 6' One empirical study has confirmed that "management's de-
cision... is the most significant factor in determining whether the tender
offer will succeed."' 62 It is therefore vital that management take a
157. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
158. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 27-28. Subsections (2) and (3) of Rule 14e-2(a), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a)(2), (3), the options of remaining neutral or stating an inability to
take a position respectively, should be eliminated. Id. See Krasik, Tender Offers: The
Target Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. Law. 455, 474 (1969). It has been argued
that management should not be required to make a recommendation because it will do
the stockholder little good and may actually mislead the investor. See Affirmative Disclo-
sure, supra note 21, at 217. This argument is premised on the fact that management and
shareholders may have conflicting interests. Id. at 217-18. But cf Klink, Management's
Role In Recommending For Or Against An Offer, 39 Antitrust L.J. 325, 325 (1969). Prior
to Rule 14e-2 "few managements have remained neutral in the face of a hostile take-over
bid. Failure to take a position ... is viewed by the market and by stockholders as tacit
approval of the offer." Id.
159. Item 4 of Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1985), now requires disclo-
sure of "the reason(s) for the position (including the inability to take a position)." This
obligation should remain intact. See Krasik, supra note 158, at 474.
160. Krasik, supra note 158, at 474. A cautionary note such as this is necessary to
warn investors that what is best for target management may not necessarily be best for an
individual shareholder. See Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 217-18 (management
and shareholders may have "sharply conflicting interest").
161. One such situation may occur during an exchange offer (for stock of the offeror).
The target may have very little information to value the offeror's stock either because the
company is not a reporting company or it has yet to comply with the disclosure require-
ments placed on the offeror.
See supra note 144 for a discussion on the SEC's power to create such an investment
system.
162. Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 206; see Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note
79, at 403 ("Management's position regarding the merits of an offer may be the most
significant factor in the offer's success or failure."); see also Johnson, supra note 79, at 6
("[Tlhe shareholder is often ill-equipped to make such a determination [whether to
tender], and he will, therefore, tend to seek advice from the most logical source-the
SOFT INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
position.
A mandatory cautionary statement appropriate for the type of soft in-
formation to be disclosed should also be required. The only issue that
the SEC, 163 the courts"6 and the commentators1 65 have agreed on is that
cautionary statements are necessary to avoid misleading the investor.
These cautionary statements have become increasingly important to
avoid misleading investors as disclosure has adapted to serve the needs of
the sophisticated as well as the unsophisticated. 66 In order to assure
continued protection of the unsophisticated investor, the cautionary
statement, though not the entire disclosure, should be written so that an
unsophisticated investor can readily understand its limitations and the
"inherent uncertainty of the information."' 6
The final policy applicable to all standards is the requirement that all
assumptions underlying soft information be disclosed. At present, disclo-
sure of assumptions is encouraged but not required 161 unless it is material
to understanding the disclosure.' 69 The SEC offered only slight justifica-
incumbent management of his own company."); Krasik, supra note 158, at 460 ("man-
agement is in the best position to explain the present position of the company and its
prospects").
163. The SEC has stated that it will not object to good faith projections that have a
reasonable basis "provided that they are presented in an appropriate format and accom-
panied by information adequate for investors to make their own judgments." Fiflis, supra
note 24, at 125 (quoting Sec. Act Release No. 5699 [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCII) 80,461, at 86,202 (Apr. 23, 1976)); see Report, supra note 30, at 345,
abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f- 81,357, at 88,673
(Nov. 3, 1977) (projections should be disclosed in good faith, on a reasonable basis, and
"accompanied by an appropriate cautionary statement").
164. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil. Co., 772 F.2d 231, 242 (6th Cir. 1985) ("provided
appropriate qualifications and explanations are made"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1195
(1986); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984) ("if the information
is released with a proper cautionary note").
165. See Fiflis, supra note 24, at 125 (commentators generally agree that qualifying
data and contextual format must be disclosed); Schneider, supra note 44, at 305 (sug-
gesting broader use of soft information if "relevant, material, reasonably reliable, and
adequately qualified"); Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 612 (investors are aware of inherent
uncertainties of projections, especially when forewarned by cautionary language); Affirm-
ative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 220 (management should state that the information is
only a prediction, and thus subject to future change).
166. If information is disclosed in a form readily understandable to the unsophisticated
investor, as it was historically, cautionary language is obviously not necessary unless the
information is extremely unreliable. When information usable only by sophisticated in-
vestors is included or when information is substantially uncertain, cautionary language
becomes much more important.
167. Report, supra note 30, at 345, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 81,357, at 88,673 (Nov. 3, 1977).
168. See 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810, 38,812 (1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1985))
(commenting on 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1979)); Report, supra note 30, at 358, abstracted in
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,357, at 88,673 (Nov. 3, 1977);
Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 629.
169. See 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810, 38,812 (1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1985))
(commenting on 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1979)). The Commission stated that "[u]nder cer-
tain circumstances the disclosure of underlying assumptions may be material to an under-
standing of the projected results." IaL In these circumstances disclosure is necessary to
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tion of this policy-to maximize the attractiveness of forecasting. 70 Ac-
cording to commentators, assumptions are important because they
"provide investors with a framework" 1 7' for analyzing the soft informa-
tion. Disclosure of underlying assumptions is vital to the investor's abil-
ity to understand the information and should therefore be mandatory. 72
3. Projections
Projections of earnings, sales, revenues and expenses are extremely val-
uable to investors because they "have a direct bearing on the estimation
of return for investors in [a company's] securities, which in turn relates
directly to present value."'17 3 One commentator has even suggested that
forecasts of future earnings are "perhaps the one piece of information
avoid anti-fraud liability. Disclosure of assumptions may also be necessary to meet the
reasonable basis and good faith test set forth in the "safe harbor" rule. 44 Fed. Reg. at
38,812. If assumptions are not disclosed, the disclosure is not protected by the "safe
harbor" and may subject the company to anti-fraud liability. See Safe Harbor, supra note
24, at 630; see also Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 355 & n.91 (require-
ment that relevant assumptions be disclosed along with projections has received judicial
support).
170. Report, supra note 30, at 358, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 81,357 (Nov. 3, 1977); see Fiflis, supra note 24, at 110; Safe Harbor,
supra note 24, at 629.
171. Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 629; see 44 Fed. Reg. 38,812 (1979) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 230.175 (1985)) (commenting on 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1979)) ("disclosure of
assumptions is believed to be an important factor in facilitating investors' ability to com-
prehend and evaluate these statements"); Dean, Public Dissemination of Projected Earn-
ings-Pros and Cons, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 511, 527 (1974) (the soundness of assumptions
upon which projections are based are extremely important); Schneider, supra note 44, at
277 ("Once investors know the basis for a prediction, they should be able to assign an
appropriate credibility factor to the prediction.").
172. See Johnson, supra note 79, at 30; Schneider, supra note 44, at 277-78; Asset Ap-
praisals, supra note 24, at 707; Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 220; Safe Harbor,
supra note 24, at 631. Because assumptions must be disclosed if "material" or if relevant
enough to place the disclosure outside the safe harbor provision, see supra note 169, their
disclosure is usually required. Furthermore, the rationale for voluntary disclosure of as-
sumptions was to maximize the attractiveness of forecasting. This Note proposes a
mandatory disclosure obligation for projections, thus negating the rationale. For soft
information other than projections, disclosure of assumptions is so important that tile
need for the assumptions outweighs the rationale. For asset appraisals, the method of
appraisal and the qualifications of those who prepared the appraisal are extremely impor-
tant. See infra note 210 and accompanying text. For "other soft information," which is
inherently less reliable, disclosure of assumptions is also essential. See infra note 211.
The Advisory Committee on Tender Offers recommended that when disclosing projec-
tions or asset valuations, the disclosure must include principal supporting assumptions.
See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
173. Fiflis, supra note 24, at 103; see Schneider, supra note 44, at 280 ("Projections and
forecasts of financial results-such as ... projections of revenues, expenses, and earn-
ings-are a special category of forward-looking information highly relevant to investors.
Indeed, expected earnings per share in the immediate future is among the most significant
factors influencing securities prices and, consequently, investment decisions."); see also
Dean, supra note 171, at 534; Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 607-08; Future-Oriented
Information, supra note 87, at 360-61.
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most sorely needed by the investor."' 7 4 Furthermore, nondisclosure of
"material" projections could lead to serious misvaluation of a corpora-
tion's securities. 75
What harm is to be weighed against the investor's need for projec-
tions? It has been argued that projections, regardless of whether the SEC
scrutinizes them, are inherently uncertain because "they are based on
numerous facts and assumptions that are subject to frequent change."' 7 6
This argument does not justify precluding the disclosure of projections
but rather reaffirms the need for the disclosure of assumptions and cau-
tionary statements. The need for projections clearly outweighs their po-
tential harm.177
Disclosure of earnings projections, accompanied by sales, revenue and
expense projections if possible, for a period of three months to one year
into the future should be mandatory.' This duty would arise on the
occurrence of a tender offer and the corporation would be allowed a rea-
sonable time to respond. It is unreasonable to mandate that a corpora-
tion forecast further into the future because forecasts "become even less
exact as they predict further into the future."' 79 Liability for the inaccu-
racy of mandatory projections would be determined as it would for the
"safe harbor;" no liability should be imposed for information disclosed in
good faith and with a reasonable basis.
Corporations should be able to petition for exemption from this disclo-
sure requirement. Corporations that cannot compile the data necessary
to produce a forecast could request such an exemption. A corporation
less than one or two years old, for example, would seek this exemp-
tion.'80 An exemption should also be available when the tender offer has
174. Johnson, supra note 79, at 5.
175. See Affirmative Disclosure, supra note 21, at 219.
176. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 Geo.
LJ. 935, 972 (1979); see Schneider, supra note 44, at 280; Fearless Forecasts, supra note
87, at 117; Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 125, at 1534, 1536; Affirmative Disclosure,
supra note 21, at 219.
177. Compare supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text with supra note 176 and
accompanying text.
178. See H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a
Purpose 317 (1979) (projections should be encouraged both within and outside the
mandatory disclosure system); Future-Oriented Information, supra note 87, at 360-61 &
n.122 ("[Managements should be required to disclose formal financial forecasts. Indeed,
it is arguable that the SEC has a statutory duty to ensure access to such information.");
Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 639 ("The most radical,, and perhaps the most effective,
amendment would be to require disclosure of forecasts."); Netv Problems, supra note 34,
at 271 ("Since the decision has been made [in this Note] to classify projections as material
facts... the rules adopted by the SEC and enforced by the courts should logically require
prompt disclosure of the projections."). Not all commentators have reached this conclu-
sion. See Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 125, at 1526.
Three months to one year is an appropriate time period. It is the result of balancing
the competing concerns of an investor's need for long-term information and the decrease
in accuracy inherent in projecting further into the future.
179. Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 616 & n.46.
180. The Advisory Committee suggested that in some circumstances "companies
1986]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
been made merely to obtain an earnings projection and to impose the
costs of producing it on the target.18' If the SEC finds bad faith, it
should respond by requiring only a three-month projection and imposing
its costs on the offeror. Finally, if disclosure of sensitive information
would jeopardize a transaction, 82 the SEC should guide the corporation
so that general information can be provided without jeopardizing the
transaction.
A "safe harbor" provision for the disclosure of any projection beyond
what is specifically required should be established.' This would en-
courage disclosure of projections disclosed in good faith and with a rea-
sonable basis because they would not subject the target to liability.
In the 1977 Advisory Committee Report to the SEC, four reasons
were given in support of a permissive rather than a mandatory disclosure
system. 18 4 These reasons are no longer valid. The Committee argued
that the SEC needed time to experiment with its policy. 8 " This argu-
ment is no longer valid because nine years have passed and have been a
sufficient period of experimentation. The Committee also feared that
some companies might find the burdens of projecting would outweigh the
benefits.186 It is, however, the investor that must be protected and not
the corporations. The third reason was that corporations should not be
exposed to liability for inaccurate projections.8 7 The basis for determin-
ing liability under the mandatory plan proposed in this Note and the
present permissive plan is the same-good faith and reasonable basis.
Finally, the Committee stated that it would be difficult for some compa-
would find it difficult, if not impossible, to prepare reasonable projections." Report,
supra note 30, at 354, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977). Reasonable projections may not be attainable due to a
lack of operating history or due to general economic factors or industry conditions. Id.
181. Information in projections, even when non-specific, is valuable to competitors.
This provision would avoid the situation where a competitor makes a tender offer for
shares of a firm for the dual purpose of obtaining this information and imposing the costs
on the target.
182. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. Examples of transactions that
could be jeopardized are the purchase or sale of assets, the acquisition of or merger with a
company, the sale or liquidation of a subsidiary or division, and the hiring of a key
employee.
183. This Note suggests a mandatory short-term projection during a tender offer. If a
company wants to disclose a longer-term forecast or to disclose a forecast at some other
time, it should still be protected by a "safe harbor" as it is today under 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.175 (1985). This coincides with the SEC policy of encouraging disclosure of soft
information. See Safe Harbor, supra note 24, at 627 & n. 111.
184. Report, supra note 30, at 354, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,357, at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977).
185. Id., abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81, 357,
at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977).
186. Id., abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81, 357,
at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977).
187. Id., abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 81, 357,
at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977).
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nies to project.' The petition system should adequately handle this
problem. With the declining validity of the traditional arguments against
mandatory disclosure of projections, the time is ripe for such a proposal.
As the "safe harbor" was an appropriate experiment in 1979, so also is a
mandatory disclosure system for projections an appropriate experiment
in 1986.
4. Asset Appraisals
Asset appraisals are estimates of the present market value of a com-
pany's assets.189 SEC policy requires, for ordinary reporting purposes,
that assets be disclosed at their historical costs-the original cost of
purchasing the asset less an allowance for depreciation.' t The difference
between the historical cost and the current value creates the need for
asset appraisals in tender offer contests.
Disclosure of appraisals, which has merely been discouraged by the
SEC, 9' has usually been prohibited by courts. 192 In certain instances,
however, disclosure has been permitted or even required. 9 3 For exam-
ple, disclosure was permitted in one case when the appraisal was highly
reliable and there was an intent to liquidate the target 194 and in another
when the appraisal involved oil and gas reserves. 95 Disclosure of an ap-
praisal is mandatory when prepared by a qualified expert with a sufficient
188. Id., abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q' 81,357,
at 88,667 (Nov. 3, 1977).
189. See Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 684-85.
190. See id at 685-86.
191. See id at 686. No SEC rule or regulation specifically prohibits disclosure of ap-
praisals, but they have been discouraged because "the methods of appraisal are based on
subjective assumptions and predictions." Id In other words, the reasons underpinning
this policy include the concern about reliability, the fear of investors giving greater
credence than would be warranted, and the impracticability of having the SEC examine
appraisals on a case-by-case basis. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 985 (3d
Cir. 1984).
192. Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 687-90; see Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744
F.2d 978, 985 (3d Cir. 1984); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292 (2d
Cir. 1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972). But see Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (amount of "surplus" that insurance company retained
above what was required by law was held to be a material fact that should have been
disclosed).
193. See Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 689-95.
194. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (corporate insiders,
possessing appraisal indicating greatly increased value for inventory traded on commod-
ity markets, offered to buy out minority shareholders and liquidate the company). The
court focused on the existence of the appraisal and the failure to disclose rather than on
the reliability of the appraisal. Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 691-92. Subsequent
cases have limited the scope of Speed to extraordinarily reliable valuations. Id.; see Gers-
tie v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1293 (2d Cir. 1973).
195. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970) (defend-
ant failed to disclose an appraisal of oil reserves that a reasonable investor ought to have




basis in fact19 6 and also when prepared during a freezeout merger. 97
An investor's need for asset appraisals varies in different circum-
stances. In situations other than a freezeout merger' 98 or an impending
liquidation, disclosure of appraisals is not crucial because investors are
provided with some present value information through the SEC's re-
quirement that "replacement cost" figures for most companies be dis-
closed.199 Appraisals are nonetheless useful to investors, particularly
when they differ from available information.2" Furthermore, investors
studying the income statement or balance sheet of a company may be
misled if no asset appraisal is provided.2"1 If the offeror intends to liqui-
date the target company2"2 or if the value of the target is principally its
assets, appraisals are crucial to an investor's decision.2"3 For example, if
196. The SEC proposed this rule in its amicus brief in Gerstle. See Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1292 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters.,
744 F.2d 978, 987 (3d Cir. 1984); South Coast Servs. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irriga-
tion Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
197. A freezeout merger, referred to as a "[g]oing private transaction" in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13e-3 (1985), which governs such transactions, includes any purchase by a com-
pany of its own stock, any tender offer for its own stock, or any solicitation to any holder
of its stock in connection with a merger, recapitalization, reorganization or similar trans-
action. Id.
Item 8(b) of Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1985), pursuant to Rule 13e-3
transaction statement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985), requires disclosure of factors impor-
tant in determining the fairness of the transaction to shareholders, including liquidation
value and any appraisal described in Item 9. Item 9(b) of the same Schedule requires a
summary of the appraisal and a description of the methods used and the qualifications of
those who prepared it. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 240 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1195 (1986). Tender offers, however, are not treated the
same as freezeout mergers. See generally Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 254 (6th Cir.
1985) (the tender offer stage of a two-tier transaction should be governed by the Williams
Act and not by freeze-out merger rules).
198. See supra note 197.
199. Both the SEC and the Financial Accounting Standards Board have "replacement
cost" rules. Inflation created the need for such provisions because historical cost no
longer provided a true picture of the value of the assets. See Asset Appraisals, supra note
24, at 697-99. These figures need only be provided on a yearly basis. Id. at 698. Hence,
in a tender offer contest, the accuracy of the replacement cost figure may depend on when
the tender offer occurred as compared to when the latest figures were disclosed.
200. Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 709-10. The greater the difference between the
appraisal and figures in currently available information, the greater the need for such an
appraisal. Id.
201. Id. at 703-07. Depreciation is based on historical cost and is a deduction from
income for income tax purposes. Any inflation or technological progress will make the
depreciation too low and income after deducting depreciation too high. Id. at 703. Fur-
thermore, when analyzing balance sheets, investors are concerned with return on assets.
If assets are at historical cost, an investor may be misled because the undervaluation of
the asset would artificially inflate the return. Id. at 705.
202. The only knowledge of an intent to liquidate the target will be the subjective plans
of the offeror. Few offerors would disclose this information. The SEC should promulgate
a "safe harbor" stating that if the offeror does not disclose an intent to liquidate, it must
wait two years to liquidate or liability will exist.
203. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 826 & n.9 (D. Del. 1951)
("plaintiffs and the SEC both reluctantly admitted the asset or real value would not be a
significant factor in the absence of a plan to liquidate"). Other cases have viewed the
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assets are appraised for much more than stated in existing disclosure,
investors may hold their shares and wait for a better offer.
The potential harm of asset appraisals is twofold: inherent uncertainty
and conscious manipulation by management. 2' Inherent uncertainly can
be minimized by strict SEC guidelines governing appraisal methods and
disclosure format.2 "5 Conscious manipulation by management will al-
ways be a possible abuse, but can be controlled by imposing stringent
standards of anti-fraud liability when appraisals are prepared by manage-
ment and by disclosing the source of the appraisal with strong cautionary
language if prepared by management. Although each harm should be
weighed into the decision to disclose appraisals, a prohibition against dis-
closure of all appraisals particularly when they are disclosed with cau-
tionary notes is unwarranted and would deprive investors of valuable
information.
Disclosure of an appraisal should be mandatory when the offeror in-
tends to liquidate the target company and when the value of the target is
principally its assets.20 6 When liquidation is not intended, disclosure of
appraisals should be required if they are reasonably certain to hold.'7 If
they are less certain, disclosure should be permissive and protected by a
"safe harbor."2 The standards for oil and gas reserves and freezeout
mergers involve entirely separate considerations and should remain as
they currently stand.209 Finally, cautionary notes and assumptions
should state how and by whom the appraisal was prepared.21 0
5. Plans, Capital Budgeting and Dividend Policy
The final category of soft information includes information such as
plans and expectations, capital budgeting and expenditures, and future
dividend policy. The plans and expectations may be to expand, contract
or redirect the corporation. Capital budgeting and expenditure is often
intent to liquidate as a relevant consideration. See Del Noce v. Delyar Corp. [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,670, at 90,292 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re
Brown Co. Sec. Litig., 355 F. Supp. 574, 583-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Asset Appraisals, supra
note 24, at 692 n.70.
204. Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 707.
205. IAl See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text on need for cautionary state-
ments and supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text discussing the need for disclosure
of assumptions.
206. See supra note 203.
207. It would be preferable to have a standard that more clearly defines a corporation's
duty to disclose. The duty is clear, however, if the appraisal was prepared by an in-
dependent appraiser; the appraisal must be disclosed. Court decisions will have to clarify
the duty for management prepared appraisals. It is certain that this standard will require
disclosure more often than the "substantially certain to hold" standard proposed in
Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1195 (1986).
208. A provision similiar to that for projections, 17 C.F.IL § 230.175 (1985), is appro-
priate. See Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 711.
209. See supra notes 195, 197 and accompanying text.
210. See Asset Appraisals, supra note 24, at 707-08.
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the acquisition or sale of assets of the corporation. This information is
inherently "softer" 21' than earnings projections or asset appraisals and
often more sensitive.212
In 1977, the Advisory Committee suggested that the SEC encourage
disclosure of plans and expectations, capital structure policies and divi-
dend policies.213 Rule 175214 incorporated these suggestions into the
"safe harbor. 21 5 Disclosure of this information is therefore purely per-
missive. The "case by case" standard proposed in Flynn, however, ap-
plies to "other soft information" as well as asset appraisals. 216  The
Starkman standard, however, is limited to projections and appraisals. 217
This "softer" information is still quite relevant to the investor's deci-
sion. 218 Any information regarding future developments is valuable in-
formation to the investor, provided it is either reliable or the investor
knows the limitations of its reliability. There are, however, potential
harmful effects of this disclosure. The target may suffer competitive
harm if disclosure of "softer" information is mandatory. 219 Disclosure
of long-range plans, expectations and budgets should not be required.
Balancing potential value against potential harm for "softer" informa-
tion results in a standard similar to that set out in Starkman that did not
apply to "other soft information. '220 If "softer" information is "substan-
tially certain to hold," then it is effectively not "softer" information, but
rather information falling outside of the first two categories, and an af-
firmative duty to disclose should exist. Should the information not rise
to this level of certainty, a "safe harbor" provision should protect those
who decide to disclose. This standard requires disclosure less often than
the "reasonably certain to hold" standard for asset appraisals yet ensures
that the investor will receive all reliable "softer" information and encour-
211. Plans and budgets are more subjective than other soft information because they
are based solely on subjective decisions made by management. The data disclosed, there-
fore, may not be fully reliable. See Fiflis, supra note 24, at 113.
212. Since this category borders on corporate strategy, it is natural that the sensitivity
of the information would be greater, as would the potential for harm regarding a competi-
tive disadvantage vis-a-vis competitors. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 276.
213. Report, supra note 30, at 346-47, abstracted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,357, at 88,673 (Nov. 3, 1977).
214. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1985).
215. 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810, 38,814 (1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1985)) (com-
menting on 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1979)) (included in the definition of a "forwardlooking
statement" is a "statement of management's plans and objectives for future company
operations").
216. Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., 744 F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984).
217. Starkman v. Marathon Oil. Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986).
218. See Schneider, supra note 44, at 274 ("filings have traditionally excluded a vast
reservoir of information which is highly relevant in predicting future developments-
namely, the plans and expectations of the company's management"); see also Fiflis, supra
note 24, at 113 (disclosing "softer" information will greatly increase the available relevant
evidence of a firm's future prospects).
219. See supra note 212.
220. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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ages corporations to disclose information that is less certain. It does so
by protecting corporations to a greater extent by disclosing under the
"safe harbor" than by not disclosing and risking anti-fraud liability if the
information is held to be "material." Special attention must be paid in
this category to the requirement of disclosing assumptions and appropri-
ate cautionary notes.
CONCLUSION
The SEC has abandoned its traditional policy and is now encouraging
disclosure of soft information in tender offer contests. The courts should
respond to this shift in policy. The Third22 ' and Sixth' Circuits have
proposed standards to provide guidance for courts attempting to do this,
but these standards have not fully accomplished their purpose. Both cir-
cuits have underestimated the ability of investors to comprehend soft in-
formation without being misled and therefore have overemphasized
reliability of the information and have undervalued the investor's need
for such information. The solution to these problems is to premise dis-
closure on the "differential disclosure" theory' and to categorize soft
information, thus allowing the need for the information to be more ap-
propriately weighed against the potential harm of disclosure for each spe-
cific type of information.
Disclosure of earnings projections, the first category, should be
mandatory. On the occurrence of a tender offer, the target should be
required to disclose an earnings projection for a period of three months
to one year into the future. In certain situations, however, corporations
should be permitted to petition the SEC for relief from some or all of this
required disclosure. Any disclosure beyond what is required should be
protected by a "safe harbor."
The investor's need for asset appraisals, the second category, is not as
great as that for earnings projections. Accordingly, asset appraisals
should not be subject to mandatory disclosure unless an intent to liqui-
date the target is present or the value of the target lies principally in its
assets. Absent this intent, disclosure of appraisals should be required as
"material" if the appraisal is reasonably certain to hold and beyond that,
a "safe harbor" should protect the disclosure of such information.
All other soft information may be grouped into a third category. Dis-
closure of information in this category should be mandatory only if the
information is "substantially certain to hold." If it is less certain, it
should be protected by a "safe harbor."
Furthermore, disclosure of assumptions underlying soft information
and cautionary notes should be required. Finally, the law regarding
management recommendations should be amended to force management
221. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
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to make a recommendation that provides investors with valuable
information.
This proposed comprehensive disclosure scheme for soft information
will minimize the inconsistencies in court decisions and thereby clarify
target corporations' duty to disclose. More importantly, it will give in-
vestors the information necessary to protect them by allowing them to
make informed decisions in tender offer contests.
Kenneth M. Tallering
